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Respect My Authority: Analyzing Claims of
Diminished U.S. Supreme Court Influence
Abroad
AARON B. AFr*
ABSTRACT
This paper critiques the argument that the U.S. Supreme Court is
losing influence among national and constitutional courts worldwide as
a result of its nonparticipation in the emerging judicial globalization. It
does so, inter alia, by reviewing two examples of how U.S. authority is
cited abroad, and concludes that arguments of diminished influence
appear overstated, and that changes in U.S. judicial influence are not
likely due to attitudes toward citation of foreign law.
INTRODUCTION
According to some observers, the legal influence of the United States
in the world is waning.' Where once the world looked to the U.S.
Supreme Court as a guiding light, now foreign courts are increasingly
disinterested in what our nine Justices have to say.2 "One of our great
exports used to be constitutional law," contends Anne-Marie Slaughter;
"we are losing one of the greatest bully pulpits we have ever had."3
Some commentators view this trend as disturbing evidence that the
United States is losing its voice in an emerging international and
transnational legal dialogue. 4 This does not appear to be a temporary
* Executive Online Editor, Indian Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D. Candidate,
2011, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2004, Indiana University. I would
like to thank Professors Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, and Peter Hook for
their guidance and support. Thanks also to my family for their help, without which this
paper would not have been written.
1. Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at Al.
2. See id.
3. Id. (quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter).
4. E.g., Rebecca A. Lefler, Note, A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case
Law as Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
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fad: the U.S. Supreme Court's fading relevance in this global judicial
dialogue is seen as a consequence of globalization.5 In sum, "Judges are
globalizing,"6 "[c]ourts are talking to one another all over the world,"7
and the United States is "out of step with [this] international
mainstream."8
There is empirical evidence offered to support this proposition. For
example, the New York Times found that the rate of citation to the U.S.
Supreme Court by the Supreme Court of Canada from 2002 to 2008 fell
by fifty percent as compared to the number of citations from 1990 to
2002.9 Particularly in human rights cases, foreign courts are now more
likely to cite the European Court of Human Rights than the U.S.
Supreme Court.10 Politics is one explanation offered for this trend." For
instance, Thomas Ginsburg views the waning influence of the U.S.
Supreme Court as the result of unpopular foreign policies undermining
U.S. standing abroad.12 Another reason suggested is that justices from
high courts desire to give as well as take.13
There are also admonitions that the United States ought to take
part in the emerging international judicial dialogue. Diane Amann calls
for "[j]ustices both to articulate when it is appropriate to look to
external sources and to set forth a framework for consultation."14 Law
student Cody Moon argues that the position of the United States "in the
Canada, and the High Court of Australia, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 165, 167 (2001)
(contending that by rejecting comparative constitutional analysis, the United States loses
out on the wisdom transnational judicial dialogue advances, and the opportunity to
contribute and influence this dialogue).
5. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103
(2000) (describing modes of judicial interaction that collectively describe how judiciaries
have been globalizing).
6. Id. at 1123.
7. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99, 99 (1994).
8. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 820 (1999).
9. Liptak, supra note 1.
10. Id. (attributing the statement to Harold Koh, the Dean of the Yale School of Law).
11. Id. (suggesting that foreign high courts are often more liberal than the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts, and as a result, are more likely to cite one another).
12. Id. (quoting Thomas Ginsburg, professor of comparative and international law at
the University of Chicago).
13. See, e.g., Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and
the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 17 (1998) (stating that
"the process of international influence has changed from reception to dialogue."); Liptak,
supra note 1 (quoting Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak and Australian High
Court Justice Michael Kirby).
14. Diane Marie Amann, International Law and the Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 GEO.
L. J. 1319, 1319 (2006).
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world legal community requires the United States Supreme Court to
engage in the comparative constitutional dialogue." 5 Law student
Rebecca Lefler speaks of the potential benefits that might flow from
engaging in this judicial dialogue.' 6 Claire L-Heureux-Dub6 cites the
lack of participation in this dialogue as an important reason for the U.S.
Supreme Court's waning influence. 7
These assertions are hard to test. The purpose of this Note is to
evaluate the claim that the U.S. Supreme Court is losing influence
among other national and constitutional courts, and the explanations
offered for this trend. Through the following discussion, this Note shows
that the available data does not compel the conclusion that U.S. judicial
influence is declining. The complete picture of the Supreme Court's
influence on foreign courts is complex, and while there is certainly some
support for the claims of diminished influence, there are reasons to be
skeptical of the explanations for this trend identified above.
The discussion in Part I proceeds in three sections. The first section
describes the U.S. Supreme Court's practice of citing to foreign
precedent and the robust, continuing debate on this subject within the
United States. The second section surveys the extent to which U.S.
Supreme Court precedent is used abroad.'8 Because transnational
judicial dialogue need not be confined to written judicial opinions, the
third section provides a survey of the "informal" contacts-interactions
beyond the context of adjudicating cases-between U.S. Supreme Court
Justices and their colleagues and counterparts around the world. This
section acknowledges that an empirical citation study alone, though
important, is likely insufficient to fully capture the possible influence of
the U.S. Supreme Court abroad.'9 Part II then evaluates the claim of
15. Cody Moon, Note, Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the United States
Supreme Court Join the Dialogue?, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 229, 246 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Lefler, supra note 4, at 190-191 ("Learning from other countries'
experiences can only enhance and clarify what is best within our own legal system;
ignoring the decisions and opinions from around the world is turning our backs on a
valuable jurisprudential resource.").
17. L'Heureux-Dubb, supra note 13, at 37 ("[T]he failure of the United States Supreme
Court to take part in the international dialogue among the courts of the world,
particularly on human rights issues, is contributing to a growing isolation and diminished
influence.").
18. As will be discussed below, there is relatively little data exclusively on the U.S.
Supreme Court. To supplement this deficiency, I will also discuss data on citation to U.S.
courts in general, while noting the percentage of such citations that refer to the Supreme
Court in particular.
19. In other words, the specific influence of a given case or a given court may only be
measured by way of counting citations and references. However, the possibility that
interactions with fellow jurists from around the world will, if only by "osmosis," exert some
influence on the U.S. Justices is too plausible to simply discount. Therefore, the final
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diminishing U.S. influence in light of Part I, critiques the elucidations
articulated by Slaughter, Ginsburg, Choudhry, and others identified in
the Introduction, and provides alternative explanations for trends in
citation to U.S. authority abroad. This project is not exhaustive but
rather a first step. The goal is to introduce an element of verifiable
metrics into a conversation that has been dominated by anecdotal
evidence in the hope that further empirical study will be conducted.
I. MEASURING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S INFLUENCE ABROAD
The influence the U.S. Supreme Court supposedly once wielded, and
supposedly is now losing, is most often cast as the preeminence of U.S.
jurisprudential ideas within the emerging global judicial community. 20
The dialogue that characterizes contemporary transnational judicial
interaction represents a paradigm shift from the top-down dictation of
the past to an exchange among peers. 21 Therefore, to determine the
extent to which ideas are exchanged, we must first determine what
methods of exchange are used by the global judicial community. This
requires consideration of the role of foreign jurisprudential ideas in the
United States and the influence of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudential
ideas abroad. Dialogue, after all, is a give and take,22 and it is only
logical to examine both sides of the conversation.
This paper approaches the issue primarily by analyzing the practice
of citation and reference to foreign precedent by national Supreme
Courts. 23 Citations are more than mere footnotes. They "mean[]
section of Part I acknowledges this potential source of otherwise difficult-to-measure
influence by and on the jurisprudence of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.
20. See Slaughter, supra note 5, passim; see also Hannah Buxbaum, From Empire to
Globalization...and Back? A Post-Colonial View of TransJudicialism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 183, 184 (2004) (describing the cross-fertilization that characterizes the
exchange of legal ideas in the emerging global judicial community); L'Heureux-Dub6,
supra note 13, at 17.
21. Indeed, it is the two-way street that distinguishes contemporary judicial dialogue
and globalization from the previous force pushing judicial interaction-imperial
domination and the supremacy of imperial courts to those of local jurisdictions. For
discussion of this difference, see Buxbaum, supra note 20, at 185.
22. As noted above, see, for example, L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 13, at 17 (stating
that "the process of international influence has changed from reception to dialogue.");
Liptak, supra note 1 (quoting Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak and Australian
High Court Justice Michael Kirby).
23. For the purposes of this paper "foreign law," "foreign precedent," and "foreign case
law" are synonymous. That is, the phrase "foreign precedent" refers to published judicial
opinions of courts outside the United States, or from a jurisdiction other than that being
discussed. Because the discussion centers on the context of judicial practice, this
phraseology does not refer to statutes, administrative regulations, or any form of non-
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something to the person citing, and presumably [the author intends
them to] have some meaning to a reader."24 That is, "citation serves the
purpose of locating the immediate decision and reasoning within the
context of [other] decisions." 25 In addition, references to cases and courts
are quantifiable and may be analyzed empirically, affording a useful
metric for the discussion at hand. For example, it is possible to
determine the frequency with which a foreign court or case is cited.
Furthermore, absent explicit reference in a judicial opinion, it is
impossible to determine whether and to what extent foreign precedent
was influential or even considered by the deciding court.
A. Use of Foreign Precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court
One element of the emerging judicial dialogue is the demonstrable
influence of foreign precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court. A brief
survey will suffice, because Professor Steven Calabresi and Stephanie
Zimdahl have already completed a thorough study of this topic. 26
As an initial matter, U.S. Supreme Court references to foreign
sources of law have been far more frequent than might be commonly
known.27 While the practice may have become more prevalent in the
twentieth century,28 it has always been a feature of U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 29 In their review, Calabresi and Zimdahl identify five
common situations in which the Court has cited or referred to foreign
judicial argumentation (including briefs and court documents, as well as law review
articles and other academic works).
24. Peter McCormick, American Citations and the McLachlin Court: An Empirical
Study, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 83, 87 (2009) (quoting John Henry Merryman, The
Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV.
613, 613 (1954)) [hereinafter McCormick 2].
25. Id.
26. See Stephen G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005) (reviewing and analyzing references to
foreign precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court over the lifetime of the Court).
Unfortunately, Calabresi and Zimdahl do not provide an empirical tally of the cases citing
foreign law. Rather, their work focuses on an examination only of "striking" cases in which
the Supreme Court has referred to foreign law. Id. at 754. In pursuit of a more complete
picture of the influence of foreign precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court, it would likely
prove useful to have quantitative data regarding citation to foreign authority, including a
breakdown by Justice.
27. Id. at 907 (concluding, after a lengthy review of over 200 years of Supreme Court
practice, that the Court's reference to foreign law is rather commonplace).
28. Id. (arguing that "the pace of the Court's reliance on foreign sources of law has
picked up in the last sixty-five years . . . .").
29. Id. at 838-39 (noting that research demonstrates a steady escalation of references
to foreign precedent over the history of the Court).
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law: 1) cases involving determinations of reasonableness; 2) cases where
the Court has sought guidance in interpreting ambiguous language; 3)
criminal cases, which account for many of the Court's references to
foreign precedent generally; 4) cases where the Court has sought to
provide logical reinforcement of its decisions; and 5) cases where the
Court needs empirical support for arguments about possible
consequences of proposed legal reforms-i.e. to demonstrate the
potential impact of legal rules by noting how they have played out in
other jurisdictions.3 0 Calabresi and Zimdahl note two categories of cases
in which the Supreme Court has rarely referred to foreign precedent,
namely cases hinging on interpretations of the original meaning of the
Constitution and cases rooted in the distinctive structure of the U.S.
government and its particular form of federalism. 1
This history notwithstanding, contemporary reference to foreign
precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court is controversial, particularly in
the adjudication of constitutional issues, and has been debated at length
in scholarly literature. 32 While the academic discussions are insightful,
30. Id. at 884.
31. Id. at 885.
32. For arguments against citing foreign precedent, see, for example, Roger P. Alford,
Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004)
(arguing that the use of foreign precedents generally is inadvisable, and outlining some
potential misuses that might occur in the citation of foreign precedents); Roger P. Alford,
Four Mistakes in the Debate on Outsourcing Authority, 69 ALB. L. REV. 653 (2006) ("It is a
grievous error to share Justice Blackmun's longing for a 'day when the majority of the
Supreme Court will inform almost all of its decisions almost all of the time with a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind."' (quoting Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court
and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 49 (1994))); John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our
Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 303 (2006) (arguing that, even on a justice-oriented
justification, the use of foreign precedent should not be used as authority in American
constitutional law); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL
AFF., July I August 2004, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature
posnerjulaug04.msp (identifying four distinct problems with the use of foreign precedent
as authority, and asserting that the problem is not learning from abroad, but treating
foreign precedent as authority "as if the world were a single legal community."); John Yoo,
Peeking Abroad?: The Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Cases,
26 U. HAw. L. REV 385 (2004) (arguing that, if used for more than mere "ornamentation"
of opinions, citation to foreign precedent raises separation of powers concerns and conflicts
with the rationale underlying U.S. judicial review as articulated in Marbury v. Madison).
For arguments in favor of citing foreign precedent, see, for example, Amann, supra note
14, 1319 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should provide guidance for when
comparative review of foreign materials is acceptable, and a framework for such
consultation); Choudhry, supra note 8 (arguing that the globalization of constitutionalism
requires that theories of constitutional interpretation come to terms with it, and analyzing
three distinct, comparative constitutional methodologies: universalist interpretation,
genealogical interpretation, dialogical interpretation); Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, Id Love
to Talk With You, LEGAL AFF., July I August 2004, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-
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more interesting for present purposes is the debate among the people
who actually choose whether and when to cite foreign law.33 The
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have debated the merits of
comparative analysis in their published opinions, 34 speeches, and public
appearances. 3 5 Justices of other courts have also weighed in on the
subject.36
1. Contours of the Debate
In early 2005, U.S. Supreme Court Justices Stephen Breyer and
Antonin Scalia engaged in a public dialogue, held at the Washington
College of Law, American University, and billed as "A Conversation on
the Relevance of Foreign Law for American Constitutional
Adjudication." 37 In the course of their discussion, Justices Breyer and
August-2004/featurejacksonjulaug04.msp (arguing that the Court has a long history of
reference to foreign legal sources, and that justices should not ignore foreign legal
material if it can help the Court reach a better understanding of U.S. law); Austen L.
Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 637, 638-42 (2007) (criticizing arguments against the citation of foreign precedents
as misplaced, and arguing that the use of foreign legal material is sensible, and
compatible with American constitutionalism and the proper role of the judiciary); Mark C.
Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 560-61 (2007)
(arguing that comparative constitutional analysis is valuable, and concluding that its
benefits outweigh any challenges); Lefler, supra note 4, at 166-67 (contending that by
rejecting comparative constitutional analysis, the United States loses out on the wisdom
transnational judicial dialogue advances, and the opportunity to contribute and influence
this dialogue); Moon, supra note 15, 246-47 (concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court, as a
leader of a world legal community, should engage in limited comparative constitutional
"dialogue" in order to help other constitutional courts draw the line between acceptable
use of comparative materials and dangerous reliance on comparative constitutional
analysis).
33. A secondary reason for preferring the arguments of practitioners to a review of the
academic debate is that many of the same themes in the latter are more accessibly
articulated in the former.
34. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-79, 604-05, 622-28 (2005); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 598 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 & n.21,
322 (2002).
35. See, e.g., The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 519 (2005) (containing the transcript of a debate between Justices Scalia and
Breyer held January 13, 2005, at the American University Washington College of Law in
Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer].
36. See Liptak, supra note 1 (quoting Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak and
Australian High Court Justice Michael Kirby).
37. 2005 Founders' Celebration Events, AM. UNIV. COLL. OF LAW,
http://www.wcl.american.edulsecle/founders/2005/050113.cfm (last visited Nov. 12, 2010);
see also Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35.
427
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:1
Scalia agree that there are certain instances where citing to foreign law
in Supreme Court opinions is appropriate, but on the whole, Justice
Breyer is supportive and Justice Scalia is critical of the practice.
Justice Breyer generally supports citing to foreign precedent in
opinions, though he is careful to note that foreign precedent in no way
binds American courts.38 In his remarks, Justice Breyer outlines three
rationales in support of the limited comparative practice he proposes.
First, he argues that citing foreign precedent could bolster fledgling
democratic institutions by lending the Court's prestige to their efforts.39
Second, he suggests that some issues are better understood as "law-
related human question[s]," as opposed to technically legal questions.
Such "law-related human questions" merit reference to the ways other
human beings (i.e. foreign judges) have addressed them.40 Third, Justice
Breyer argues that reference to foreign precedent can help inform the
judicial process by illustrating the possible implications or consequences
of a particular decision.41
Michael Kirby, former Justice of the High Court of Australia, has
made similar arguments. He suggests that,
[t]o many judges in national courts, faced with cases for
decision involving the meaning of their own constitutional
charters of rights, it has often seemed appropriate and
useful, over recent years, to reach for the exposition of
analogous problems, written by judges and decision-
makers in the courts of other countries ... grappling with
similar problems. 42
38. Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35, at 523.
39. See id. ("In some foreign countries, people are struggling to establish institutions
that will help them protect democracy and human rights .... They want to demonstrate
the importance of having independent judges enforce constitutionally protected human
rights . . . . And if we sometimes refer to their decisions, the references may help those
struggling institutions.").
40. See id. at 528 (giving Breyer's statement that "American and foreign judges alike
are human beings using similar legal texts, dealing with a somewhat similar human
problem"; thus justifying "reaching out to those other nations, reading their decisions . . .
even though they cannot determine the outcome of a question that arises under the
American Constitution.").
41. See id. at 537 ("If, for example, a foreign court, in a particular decision, had shown
that a particular interpretation of similar language in a similar document had had an
adverse affect on free expression, to read that decision might help me apply the American
Constitution.").
42. Michael Kirby, Citation of Foreign Decisions in Constitutional Adjudication: The
Relevance of the Democratic Deficit. 43 SUFFOLK L. REV.117, 117 (2009).
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In doing so, Justice Kirby notes that foreign judges are not showing
improper deference, loyalty, or obedience to the rulings of foreign
courts.43 Rather, foreign precedent concerning related or analogous
problems arising under domestic law is seen as "helpful and informative
and therefore useful in the development of the municipal decision-
maker's own opinions."44 Addressing critics of the practice, Justice Kirby
argues that reference to foreign precedent merely "helps the municipal
decision-maker to see his or her problem in a wider context," a function
similar to that Justice Breyer ascribes to citations of law review articles
and treatises.45
Justices Breyer and Scalia agree that citing foreign precedent might
be justified to show that the Court's adoption of a given rule would not
lead to disastrous results.46 This minor point of agreement
notwithstanding, Justice Scalia is critical of the practice of citing foreign
law. First, he argues that citation to foreign precedent lends itself to
manipulation. That is, with a world of jurisprudence from which to
draw, a judge can almost always find some precedent supporting his or
her desired outcome-a kind of judicial cherry picking.47 Second, he
contends that American judges do not understand the context in which
foreign decisions were rendered, leading to inappropriate comparisons. 48
Finally, Justice Scalia argues that foreign law is irrelevant, since the
Constitution was not meant to grow or change, but to remain a static
baseline against which legislative acts are measured.4 9
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 130; Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35, at 541.
46. See Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35, at 526 (quoting Justice
Scalia: "Of course, you can cite foreign law to show-Justice Breyer gave an example-to
show that if the Court adopts this particular view of the Constitution, the sky will not
fall.").
47. See id. at 531. Chief Justice John Roberts, during his confirmation hearings,
espoused a similar concern. In responding to a question from Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ),
Roberts stated that with "[floreign law, you can find anything you want.... And that
actually expands the discretion of the judge. It allows the judge to incorporate his or her
own personal preferences . . .. I think that's a misuse of precedent." Confirmation Hearing
on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 616-17 (2005), available at
http://frwebgatel.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdoclD=HUFCQ0/0/1/0&WAIS
action=retrieve.
48. Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35, at 528-29 ("One of the
difficulties using foreign law is that you don't understand what the surrounding
jurisprudence is.").
49. Id. at 535 ("1 regard the Constitution as having set a floor to what American society
can democratically do. [If that floor says nothing about issue X, it is] not the job of the
Constitution to change things by judicial decree; change is brought about by democratic
legislation.").
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John Greaney, former Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, is similarly wary of citing to foreign precedent. First,
even contextual reference to foreign law disregards what Justice
Greaney terms the "uniqueness principle": the idea that no matter how
similar another country's law might be, each state has a cultural and
social milieu that shapes and defines its laws.50 In addition, differences
in the purposes and processes of judicial selection have an impact on
what he terms the "art and science of judging."5' The resulting
differences therefore render practices and decisions of foreign courts
inapposite. 52 Finally, Justice Greaney echoes Justice Scalia's worry
about jurisprudential cherry picking-what Justice Greaney describes
as jurisprudential "opportunism that is incongruent with American
constitutional adjudication."53
Considering the role cast for foreign precedent by its proponents and
the trepidation of its opponents, one may tentatively conclude that the
influence of foreign jurisprudence on the U.S. Supreme Court is limited
to a modest background role. Based on the descriptions offered by
Justice Breyer and Justice Kirby as to the use of foreign precedent, the
influence of foreign precedent is perhaps less than the volume 54 of the
debate might indicate. Certainly some shared ideas are influential, but
this influence seems limited to providing background information,
rather than serving a dispositive role in a given case.
Lastly, it may be tempting to infer from the preceding discussion
that the hostility of some prominent U.S. judges to the use of foreign
precedent may leave foreign jurists less inclined to cite U.S. precedent.
However, that conclusion is premature, and to accurately assess the
extent of the U.S. Supreme Court's influence abroad, it is necessary to
examine the use of U.S. precedent overseas.
50. John M. Greany, An Argument Against Citation of Foreign Decisions in
Constitutional Adjudication, Panel Remarks at the Suffolk University Twenty Ninth
Annual Donahue Lecture Series, in Citation to Foreign Decisions in Constitutional
Adjudication, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 135, 145 (2009).
51. Id. at 146.
52. See id. at 145-46.
53. Id.; see also Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 67 (2006) (mentioning that while selective
manipulation of citation from a home jurisdiction is also possible, the practice "can be
more readily detected").
54. "Volume" refers to both the vitriol of some critiques, and the sheer amount of
material addressing the subject.
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B. Use of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Abroad
In contrast to the vigorous debate that characterizes the U.S.
Supreme Court's use of foreign case law, many courts in other countries
take a more expansive view of the use of foreign precedent. For example,
in Australia,5 5 Canada,56 India,57 Israel,58 New Zealand,59 Singapore,60
and South Africa,6 1 to name but a few, reference to U.S. precedent is hot
uncommon. 62 Many of the judges in these countries offer justifications
for their comparative endeavors similar to those advanced by Justices
Breyer and Kirby.63
In Canada, citation to U.S. precedent is seen as "an aspect of a more
general trend" of comparative exercise. 64 Indeed, the entire practice of
referring to foreign precedent is merely reflective of the "legal
cosmopolitanism" that Canadian jurists have found to be "a valuable
source of enrichment and greater sophistication."65 In Canada
comparative practice has been used to provide important background on
55. E.g., Paul E. von Nessen, The Use of American Precedents by the High Court of
Australia, 1901-1987, 14 ADEL. L. REV. 181, 184-86 (1992) [hereinafter von Nessen,
American Precedents].
56. E.g., McCormick 2, supra note 24, 108-113.
57. E.g., Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88
CoLUM. L. REV. 537, 545-47 (1988).
58. E.g., Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel's Jurisprudence of Free Speech, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21, 23-27 (1981).
59. E.g., James Allan et al., The Citation of Overseas Authority in Rights Litigation in
New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 1, 2, 5-6 (2007).
60. E.g., Lester, supra note 57, at 541-44.
61. See, e.g., Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, A Tool, Not a Master: The Use of Foreign
Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 1188, 1207-09 (2001).
62. Indeed, U.S. constitutionalism more generally has left an undeniable imprint on
the constitutional traditions of, among others, Germany, Japan, and Korea. See generally
Helmut Steinberger, American Constitutionalism and German Constitutional
Development, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin and Albert Rosenthal, eds. Columbia Univesity
Press: 1990) at 199 (discussing the history of U.S. constitutional influence on Germany);
and Lawrence W. Beer, Constitutionalism and Rights in Japan and Korea, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ABROAD
(Louis Henkin and Albert Rosenthal, eds. Columbia University Press: 1990) at 225
(discussing the history of U.S. constitutional influence on Japan and Korea).
63. E.g., Bijon Roy, An Empirical Survey of Foreign Jurisprudence and International
Instruments in Charter Litigation., 62 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 99, 109 (2004) (quoting
Israeli Supreme Court President, Aharon Barak, "The purpose of [] comparison is
inspiration.. . . Comparative law is a 'guide to finding the appropriate solution .. . [that]
grants comfort to the judge and gives him the feeling that he is treading on safe ground."').
64. Gerard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME.
L. REV 211, 216 (1994).
65. Id. at 217.
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legal questions via consideration of "the successes and failures of
various approaches" taken by other states and is driven by a desire "to
benefit from expertise acquired [by longstanding non-Canadian
constitutional jurisprudence]."66
Justices from Australia have advanced similar arguments. For
example, Justice Kirby has been an outspoken advocate of comparative
reference to foreign precedent.67 As he notes in a recent article,
references to foreign precedent by the High Court of Australia are quite
uncontroversial. Such references are used because they "have been
found helpful and informative and therefore useful in the development
of the municipal decision-maker's own opinions concerning apparently
similar problems presented by the municipal constitution or other
laws."68 And while reference to international law in certain contexts
may be controversial,69 the utility of referring to jurisprudence of other
countries as a means of elucidating the meaning of the Australian
Constitution remains unquestioned. 70
Although courts in many countries commonly refer to foreign
precedent, Canada and Australia are particularly useful for measuring
the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court abroad. Of obvious benefit is
the fact that these countries speak English,71 but of even more benefit is
the fact that observers have extensively studied and documented the
practices of the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of
Australia with special attention to the citation of U.S. precedent.
Section B will end by noting any conclusions that can be drawn from the
discussion, with an eye to addressing arguments that the influence of
the U.S. Supreme Court is waning due to hostility toward comparative
practice.72
1. Canadian Reference to U.S. Precedent and to the U.S. Supreme
Court
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, largely as a result of the country's
history, Canadian courts have long cited foreign precedent73 in general
66. L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 13, at 19-20. Note the similarity between this
justification and that provided by Justice Breyer during his public conversation with
Justice Scalia. See Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35, at 523.
67. See, e.g., supra Part I.A.1.
68. Kirby, supra note 42, at 117.
69. Id. at 123 (quoting Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562 at 589-95 (McHugh,
J. concurring)).
70. Id. at 124.
71. This is a distinct advantage given the author's monolingual training.
72. See, e.g., Lefler, supra note 4, at 167; Liptak, supra note 1.
73. Here foreign precedent refers to published, non-Canadian judicial decisions.
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and U.S. precedent in particular. 74 Reference to U.S. precedent in the
twentieth century began increasing with the end of appeals to the
United Kingdom in 1949.75 The practice has been most pronounced in
areas of constitutionalism and human rights.76 Reference to U.S.
jurisprudence increased with the adoption of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms in 1982,77 though such references "would always
have to be adjusted to suit the different Canadian context."78 Other
anecdotal evidence reinforces this picture of Canadian constitutional
jurists seeking to benefit from U.S. experience, particularly the
experience of the Warren and Burger Courts.79 However, painting a
more verifiable picture of the Supreme Court of Canada's (SCC) use of
U.S. precedent-the U.S. Supreme Court in particular-requires
turning to empirical study.
Two particularly relevant studies8 o focus on the citation of U.S.
precedent by the SCC. One study by S.I. Bushnell reviews citations from
the SCC's inception in 1876 until 1983.81 The other study, conducted by
Peter McCormick, was completed in two parts. Part one 82 analyzes
citations from 1945 to 1994 (McCormick 1), and part two88 analyzes
citations from 2000 to 2008 (McCormick 2). Bushnell and McCormick
use slightly different methodologies in their studies. Bushnell counts
cases citing to U.S. authority, whereas McCormick counts citations
themselves. 84 The pertinent differences are noted in the review below.
a. By the Numbers
As an introductory remark, and to provide some context for the
following discussion, it merits observing that the Supreme Court of
74. La Forest, supra note 64, at 212-13.
75. In 1949, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London ceased to be the
court of final appeal. L'Heureux-Dubb, supra note 13, at 17.
76. Id. at 18.
77. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
78. La Forest, supra note 64, at 214.
79. See, e.g., L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 13, at 19-21.
80. Here, relevant studies are those that focused specifically on U.S. citations or noted
the frequency of U.S. Supreme Court precedents as a sub-category of U.S. authority more
generally.
81. S.I. Bushnell, Note, The Use of American Cases, 35 U. N.B. L.J. 157 (1986).
82. Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations 1945-
1994: A Statistical Overview, 8 SUPREME CT. L. REv. 527 (1997) [hereinafter McCormick
1].
83. McCormick 2, supra note 24.
84. To be clear, Bushnell counts cases citing U.S. authority, whereas McCormick's
studies count individual citations.
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Canada cites itself more often than any other source of authority.85
Canadian appellate courts are cited about one-third as often as SCC
precedent, and Canadian trial courts are cited half as often as Canadian
appellate courts, or one-sixth as often as SCC precedent.86 U.K.
precedents are cited one-twelfth as often as SCC authority; U.S.
precedents are cited half as often as U.K. authority, or one-twenty-
fourth as often as SCC authority; and other authorities are cited one-
forty-eighth as often as SCC precedent.87 The total number of judicial
citations counted in the combined McCormick studies is 53,602.88
According to McCormick, between 1945 and 2008, approximately
half of all citations to U.S. authority were references to decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court.89 The overall number of citations to U.S. authority
remained fairly consistent between the two time periods covered by
McCormick's studies-3.5% of all SCC citations between 2000 and
20089o and 4.3% of all SCC citations between 1945 and 1994.91 By
contrast, if one uses the Bushnell method to count the number of cases
85. McCormick 2, supra note 24 at 91.
86. Id. (referring to tbl. 1).
87. Id.
88. McCormick 1 analyzes over 40,000 citations, and McCormick 2 analyzes 13,602.
McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 532; and McCormick 2, supra note 24 at 91. To illustrate
these numbers, consider Table 1 from id. at 91:
Table 1: Sources of Judicial Authority-SCC, 2000-2008
Source of Citations Number Percentage
SCC 7,989 58.7%
Canadian Appeal Courts 2,452 18.0%
Canadian Trial Courts 1,479 10.9%
England 824 6.1%
United States 476 3.5%
Other Countries & Supranational 220 1.6%
Canadian Boards & Tribunals 162 1.2%
Total 13,602
89. McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 91-93 (identifying this ratio for the period 2000-
2008, and commenting that the number is consistent with his prior study covering 1945-
1994). See also id. at 92 (referring to Table 3 (below) for the 2000-2008 breakdown);
McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 541.
Table 3: SCC Citations to American Judicial Authority 2000-2008
Source of Citations Number Median Date Percentage
US Supreme Court 220 1973 46.2%
US Federal Courts 110 1989 23.1%
US State Courts 140 1984 29.4%
US Board & Tribunal 6 1990 1.3%
Total 476 1981 1
90. McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 91 tbl.1.
91. See McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 532.
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that cite to some U.S. decision during the pre-Charter period (1876-
1983), U.S. authority accounted for roughly 9% of all SCC citations. 92
Analyzing McCormick 2's data (2000-2008) using the same method, one
finds that 14% of the total cases reference the U.S. Supreme Court, a
large subsection of the 20% of total cases that reference any J.S.
authority. 93
McCormick 1 provides ratios of the SCC's citation to its own
precedent relative to citation to U.S. Supreme Court decisions by case-
type.94 Overall, the SCC cited itself eight times for every one cite to the
U.S. Supreme Court; the same ratio appeared in those cases identified
as Charter cases.95 The ratio for public law and criminal law cases
stands at ten SCC citations for every one U.S. Supreme Court citation,96
and in private law cases the ratio stands below four SCC citations for
every one U.S. Supreme Court citation.97
It is interesting to note that for the period of the McCormick 1
study, private law cases constituted a growing segment of the SCC
docket. U.S. state court decisions accounted for three-fifths of the
citations to U.S. authority in private law cases.98 Just under half of all
citations to the U.S. Supreme Court appear in Charter cases, but, in
Charter cases, citations to the U.S. Supreme Court represent 75% of the
total number of citations to U.S. authority.99
b. Trends
During the pre-Charter era, Bushnell observed that the SCC cited
significantly more U.S. authority prior to the early 1900s, with a
resurgence from 1970 to 1983, the last decade of the study.100 The period
exhibiting the greatest number of citations to U.S. precedent was from
1876 to 1886, during which time 19% of SCC decisions included some
reference to U.S. authority.'10 Bushnell suggested that because the SCC
92. Bushnell, supra note 81, at 160.
93. McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 93-94 tbl.4.
94. McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 540 tbl.5. These numbers represent the 10-year
period between 1983 and 1993.
95. Id. "Charter cases" refers to cases arising under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, discussed supra note 77.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 542.
99. Id. at 542.
100. See Bushnell, supra note 81, at 160-61 tbl.2.
101. Id.
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was new, it looked abroad more frequently to find precedent with which
to adjudicate.102
Citation to U.S. authority increased from 1945 to 1994 (beginning at
1.5% of all citations, and ending at 6.87%),103 with a spike in 1990.104 It
is noteworthy that during this same period, the SCC cited all authority
more frequently, hence "American references represent[ed] a growing
share of a growing pie." 05 However, between 2000 and 2008, "American
authority [was] not a major feature of the case law of the McLachlin
Court, and [was] somewhat less prominent than was the case for the
two preceding Chief Justiceships." 06 The decrease after the 1990s could
be attributed to the significant turnover on the SCC between 1994 and
2000--only Chief Justice McLachlin was on the SCC in both 1994 and
2000.107
A final trend identified by the studies shows that the median "age"
of U.S. Supreme Court cases cited by the SCC is thirty years. 08 Both
McCormick 1 and McCormick 2 found the Warren and Burger Courts to
be the most commonly cited by the SCC.1o9 The consistent preference for
the Warren and Burger Courts' opinions over more recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions weakens Ginsburg's claim that the decline in citation to
U.S. authority is due to political disagreement with the George W. Bush
Administration.1 0
102. See id. at 163-64. Bushnell also suggests that a possible reason for the increased
frequency of U.S. citations during this early period lies in the underlying philosophy of law
at the time. During the nineteenth century and into the very early twentieth century it
was still commonplace to speak of the common law as related to natural law, merely
awaiting discovery. Thus, it would not matter if the law had been discovered by an
American, Canadian, or English court. See id.
103. McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 533 tbl.1.
104. Id. at 534 fig. 1.
105. Id. at 534.
106. McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 94.
107. See id. at 95-96. McCormick also notes that "what the figures from the 1990s
suggest, and those from the new decade do not, is a frequency of citation implying a steady
conversation about American judicial ideas. This conversation was joined on a regular
basis by most of the members of the Court; there were half-a-dozen members of that Court
who cited American decisions more than a dozen times every year." Id. at 95.
108. Id. at 93. This contrasts with SCC citation to its own precedent at a much
"younger" interval, with a median age of six years. See McCormick 2, supra note 24, at
101-02.
109. See id. at 98-99 tbl.6; McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 546.
110. Supra note 12, and accompanying text. The SCC preference for older USSC
precedent provides some support for an inference that, beginning in the 1980s, the U.S.
Supreme Court began moving in a different direction than other national courts.
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c. Other Explanations and Conclusions
Although some of the preceding discussion considers citation to U.S.
precedent in general, the SCC has always cited to the U.S. Supreme
Court more than any other U.S. court."'1 While citation to theiU.S.
Supreme Court only rose far above citation to other U.S. courts during
the Charter era, the overall percentages remained fairly consistent over
both McCormick's studies. From 1945 to 1994, the percentage
breakdown of citation to the U.S. Supreme Court, other federal courts,
and state courts was approximately 50%, 24%, and 26%, respectively. 112
From 2000 to 2008, the percentage breakdown was roughly 47%, 23%,
and 30%, respectively. 113 This data allows one to draw conclusions,
discussed below, about the influence of the Supreme Court by inference,
even when the data speaks only of citations to U.S. authority in general.
Legal education is one commonly suggested reason for the general
increase in citation to U.S. authority over the time periods studied.
Proponents argue that Canadian judges and lawyers who receive at
least some of their training in the United States are more inclined to
both cite and base arguments on U.S. authority.114 Similarly, Gerard La
Forest, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, posited the
U.S. legal education of Canadian legal scholars as one possible reason
why Canadian jurists commonly cite U.S. authority.115 Others have
commented that the availability and use of American law reporters in
Canadian law schools may also contribute to a willingness to cite U.S.
authority.116
111. McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 541 n.31.
112. McCormick 1 shows that the percentage breakdown of USSC, other federal courts,
and state courts from 1945 to 1983 is 40120/40, while the breakdown in 1997 was 50/20/25.
The numbers provided above are derived from calculations performed on the data
provided in id. at 541, n.31.
113. McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 92-93 tbl.4.
114. See Bushnell, supra note 81, at 169. A similar view is expressed by former SCC
Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubd. L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 13, at 20-21 ("When time
comes to look for solutions to similar problems, [lawyers and judges who received legal
training abroad] naturally turn for inspiration and comparison to those jurisdictions
whose ideas are familiar to them.").
115. La Forest, supra note 64, at 212-13.
116. See, e.g., J.M. MacIntyre, The Use of American Cases in Canadian Courts, 2 U.
BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 478, 478 (1966). The advent of electronic databases, such as
Westlaw and LexisNexis in the United States, and the World Legal Information Institute,
and the practice of some courts posting published decisions online have made far more
international law and foreign law available to courts around the globe. As a result, it is
unclear whether the availability of foreign precedent during law school is determinative of
a lawyer's subsequent willingness to cite foreign law. Examples of courts posting decisions
online include the U.S. Supreme Court, European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American
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Yet of the sixty-two Justices to sit on the SCC during the period
Bushnell studied, six were educated in the United States-five at
Harvard, and one at the University of Michigan.'17 Moreover, according
to McCormick 1, the education explanation is not supported by the data.
McCormick notes that only four of the top eighteen SCC Justices
(ranked by their frequency of citation to U.S. authority) and only one of
the top six received any training in the United States.118 These U.S.-
trained SCC Justices 19 account for only one-sixth of the "judge years"
accounted for in the McCormick 1 study, and only 32.4% of U.S.
citations overall.120 McCormick 2 echoes this finding and suggests that
the practice of citing U.S. authority began with justices familiar with
U.S. authority from their legal training and spread to other justices. 121
When McCormick 2 was published, "for almost the first time since the
Second World War, there [was] not a single judge on the SCC with a law
degree from an American University."122
What, then, can be said about the overall influence of U.S. precedent
on Canadian jurisprudence? It seems clear that "[d]espite geographical
proximity, considerable cross-border movement, similar economies and
extensive commercial linkages, U.S. courts have had little direct effect
on the evolution of Canadian jurisprudence."l 23 Yet even absent a direct
Court of Human Rights, International Court of Justice, and the European Court of
Justice, to name but a few.
117. Bushnell, supra note 81, at 169. During the editing process, I was asked to account
for the potential impact of judicial clerks who may have received their legal education in
the United States. The subject of clerks is arguably irrelevant to the discussion presented
here for two reasons. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that the role of judicial clerks in
the drafting of opinions is that of a ghostwriter, not a principal author. A clerk's role is to
prepare a draft as though the judge had written it. Secondly, and most importantly, the
final published opinion will include only those citations the judge has determined are
appropriate. It is ultimately the judge's opinion, without so much as a footnote identifying
the clerk who prepared the first draft. The idea that relatively inexperienced law clerks
have so much influence that they shape their judge's citation practices is dubious at best.
It is hard to imagine Justice Scalia, for example, authoring an opinion citing foreign law in
a manner similar to Justice Kirby simply because an enterprising law clerk thought to
include the citations in a rough draft. I recognize that this discussion assumes the process
of judicial opinion drafting in other countries is similar to that common in the United
States. This assumption may be unwarranted, but is a topic well beyond the scope of this
essay.
118. McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 537. One of the top six, interestingly, is Gerard La
Forest.
119. Id. For the complete list of the SCC's U.S. citations per year, see id. at 546 tbl.2.
120. Id. at 537. "Judge years" refers to the number of years of experience in the
aggregate of the judges on the court. For example, a five judge panel in which each sitting
judge had served for six years would add up to a total of thirty "judge years."
121. McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 97.
122. Id.
123. McCormick 1, supra note 82, at 533.
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effect, the upward trend of SCC citation to U.S. authority during most of
the twentieth century cautions against reading too much into the more
recent, modest decline. Correlations do not prove causation, and
perhaps the dip in U.S. citations in the early twenty-first century is
better explained by a maturing SCC jurisprudence, rather than an
effect caused by U.S. hostility to comparative exercise, or political
disagreements. Thus, there is reason to be skeptical of claims that any
diminishing influence is correctable through increased U.S.
participation in the emerging transnational judicial dialogue, at least
vis-A-vis Canada.
2. Australian Reference to U.S. Precedent
Like Canada, Australia has a long history of citing foreign precedent
in general, and U.S. precedent in particular. Both countries share a
history as part of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 124 and like
Canada, Australian citation to U.S. precedent began roughly the same
time as the last bonds of colonialism were loosening.125 Additionally,
there exists abundant anecdotal evidence describing the High Court of
Australia's (HCA) citation to U.S. and other foreign precedent. 126 There
are also quantitative studies of the frequency with which U.S. authority
is cited by the HCA.
In addition to brief discussions in larger works, 127 Paul von Nessen
has tallied and analyzed HCA citation to U.S. authority over the last
century, reviewing the practice from 1901 to 2002 in two separate
papers. 128 In his reviews, von Nessen used two slightly different
124. See von Nessen, American Precedents, supra note 55, at 181-186.
125. See id. at 184. For example, the von Nessen study discussed in this section begins
with the year 1901-one year after the passage of the Parliamentary Act that constitutes
Australia's Constitution. Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900 (Imp), 63 & 64 Victoria, c.
12, § 9 (U.K.) (enacting the Australian Constitution).
126. See, e.g., Bruce Topperwien, Foreign Precedents, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA 280, 280-81 (Tony Blackshield et al. eds., 2002) ('The High
Court regularly cites cases from England, the USA, Canada and NZ, and occasionally from
other common law countries. The Court rarely cites cases from non-common law
countries." (emphasis omitted)); Kirby, supra note 42 (discussing how, for judges grappling
with a constitutional issue, foreign or international judicial decisions dealing with a
comparable issue are of a "helpful and informative" nature); Lefler, supra note 4, at 178-
82.
127. E.g., Russell Smyth, Citations by Court, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HIGH
COURT OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 126, at 98; Topperwien, supra note 126.
128. The first paper covers the period 1901-1990. See von Nessen, American Precedents,
supra note 55. The second paper summarizes the findings of the first, and proceeds to
update it with new data covering the period 1991-2002. See Paul von Nessen, Is There
Anything to Fear in Transnationalist Development of Law? The Australian Experience, 33
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methodologies to compile his data. In the first study (von Nessen 1), he
counted individual references and citations manually from cases
published in the Commonwealth Law Reports series between 1901 and
1990.129 For the second study (von Nessen 2), he took advantage of
electronic databases to search for all cases reported in the
Commonwealth Law Reports from 1990 to 2002 by using the names of
U.S. reporter series as keywords.130 Von Nessen divided the citations
tallied in these complementary studies into eight categories:
constitutional law, public law, contracts and commercial law, tort law,
criminal law, other common law, other statutory, and miscellaneous. 3 1
a. By the Numbers
In absolute numbers, the High Court of Australia has typically cited
its own decisions more than any other court.132 However, as a
PEPP. L. REV. 883 (2006) [hereinafter von Nessen, Australian Experience]. Because the
second paper thoroughly reviews the findings of the first, the discussion in this section
will generally rely on the later study for the sake of simplicity.
129. See von Nessen, American Precedents, supra note 55, at 187-93; von Nessen,
Australian Experience, supra note 128, at 892-96.
130. See von Nessen, Australian Experience, supra note 128, at 914-17.
131. Id. at 895.
132. Russell Smyth, supra note 127, at 98, 98-99 (reviewing the number of citations to
authority by the High Court of Australia in five sample years-1920, 1940, 1960, 1980,
1996). The exception to this proposition, as Smyth notes, is the year 1940. Id. at 99. The
data is reproduced in part below. Id. at 98 (omitting the more detailed breakdown by court
for Australia, the United Kingdom, and "Other").
Citations by the High Court
Cited Court 1920 1940 1960 1980 1996
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Total 524 (27.8%) 285 (20%) 1182 (46.4%) 1512 (54.9%) 5745 (66.5%)
Australian
courts
Total 1201 (63.7%) 942 (66%) 1041 (40.8%) 888 (32.3%) 1522 (17.6%)
English
courts
Courts in 89 (4.7%) 66 (4.6%) 69 (2.7%) 159 (5.8%) 470 (5.4%)
other
countries
Secondary 72 (3.8%) 129 (9%) 255 (10.1%) 193 (7%) 904 (10.5%)
authorities
Grand Total 1886 (100%) 1428 (100%) 2547 (100%) 2752 (100%) 8641 (100%)
(including
omitted
data)
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percentage of total citations to authority, it appears that U.K. courts in
aggregate were cited more often than even Australian courts until
1960.133 In 1920 and 1940, citation to U.K. precedent accounted for
63.7% and 66%, respectively, of all High Court citations to authority,
while citation to Australian courts accounted for only 27.8% and 20%,
respectively.134 By contrast, citation to non-U.K., non-Australian courts
remained consistently low. Such citations reached a high of 5.8% of all
High Court citations to authority in 1980, a low of 2.7% in 1960, and
accounted for 5.4% in 1996.13s Interestingly, with the exception of 1920,
secondary sources consistently accounted for a greater percentage of all
High Court citation to authority than citation to non-U.K., non-
Australian precedent. 136
Between 1903 and 1999, the High Court of Australia cited foreign
precedent in an average of 87.7% of reported cases. 3 7 The years 1911 to
1920 saw the lowest percentage of cases citing foreign precedent, 38
while the years 1961 to 1970 and 1991 to 1999 saw the highest.139
During the full period, 1903 to 1999, an average of 15.3% of High Court
cases cited U.S. authority.140 By comparison, over the same period an
average of 83% of High Court cases cited U.K. authority, 12.8% cited
133. Id. at 98-99. As discussed in more length below, one possible explanation (based on
temporal correlation) is that until 1986 cases originating in Australia could be appealed to
the Privy Council in London, and that this final level of appeal perpetuated reliance on
English precedents. Id. at 99.
134. Id. at 98.
135. Id.
136. Id. The percentages by year are as follows: 1920: 3.8% (versus 4.7% foreign courts);
1940: 9% (versus 4.6% foreign courts); 1960: 10.1% (versus 2.7% foreign courts); 1980: 7%
(versus 5.8% foreign courts); 1996: 10.5% (versus 5.4% foreign courts). See supra note 132.
137. See Topperwien, supra note 126, at 281. This piece does not, for whatever reason,
include data for the years 1901-1903, hence the small difference in periods reviewed in
this section. The relevant data is reproduced in the table below. Id.
Percentages of High Court Cases in which Foreign Precedents have been Cited
Cases from 1903- 1911- 1921- 1931- 1941- 1951- 1961- 1971- 1981- 1991-
10(%) 20(%) 30(%) 40(%) 50(%) 60(%) 70(%) 80(%) 90(%) 99(%)
England 83 70 82 88 78 81 86 89 85 88
USA 14 10 11 12 10 9 8 13 25 41
Canada 4 4 7 7 5 6 6 10 21 37
NZ 5 4 7 13 10 8 13 15 20 33
Any 88 75 87 89 91 84 92 91 88 92
foreign
138. See id. During this period, the High Court cited foreign precedents in only 75% of
its cases. Id.
139. See id. Both periods saw 92% of High Court decisions including citation to some
foreign precedent. Id.
140. See id.
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New Zealand authority, and 10.7% cited Canadian precedents. 141 The
years 1981 to 1999 show by far the greatest percentage of High Court
cases citing U.S. authority: 25% for 1981 to 1990 and 41% for 1991 to
1999.142
Turning to U.S. citations, between 1901 and 1990 there were a total
of 3,858 citations to U.S. authority. The two leading decades of von
Nessen's first study by number of U.S. citations were the first, 1901 to
1910, and the last, 1981 to 1990, with the latter boasting nearly twice
the number of U.S. citations as the former. The decade with the most
U.S. citations, 1981 to 1990, also saw roughly six times as many
citations as the decade with the fewest, 1961 to 1970.143 During that
period, constitutional law cases accounted for the majority of U.S.
citations. In fact, there were roughly three times as many constitutional
law cases as criminal law cases, the next highest area of law.144 The
percentage of cases from 1901 to 1990 citing some U.S. authority,
broken down by category, are as follows: constitutional law: 54.7%;
public law: 8.8%; contracts/commercial: 3.5%; criminal: 5.2%; tort: 5%;
other common law: 15.6%; other statutory: 5.5%; miscellaneous: 1.7%.145
Von Nessen's studies also present some anecdotal evidence of the
role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the HCA's practice of citing to U.S.
authority. For example, von Nessen notes that "[i]nitially, many of the
Justices of the High Court (including a number actually involved in the
drafting of the Australian Constitution) preferred to embark upon
interpretation of a written constitution with guidance from the U.S.
Supreme Court, a tribunal with over a century's experience in that
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. von Nessen, Australian Experience, supra note 128, at 899 tbl.1. The table is
reproduced below, with abbreviations consistent with infra text accompanying note 145.
References to United States Cases by the High Court 1901-1990
Decade Total Con Pub Comm Tort Crim CL SL Misc
1901-1910 565 404 46 23 7 9 22 47 7
1911-1920 474 341 46 11 22 2 30 16 6
1921-1930 273 203 6 21 8 0 28 5 2
1931-1940 269 130 7 16 36 7 22 45 6
1941-1950 366 284 29 6 0 7 16 11 13
1951-1960 296 190 22 4 42 3 31 3 1
1961-1970 190 95 14 6 37 8 14 16 0
1971-1980 329 92 52 12 10 30 90 17 26
1981-1990 1096 370 118 37 31 134 349 53 4
Totals 3,858 2,109 340 136 193 200 602 213 65
144. See id.
145. Id. at 900 graph 1.
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process."14 6 By the 1920s, von Nessen notes, this preference shifted, and
a majority of the HCA started viewing U.K. interpretive principles as
more applicable than U.S. methods. 147 Other possible reasons for the
attitude shift away from the U.S. Supreme Court include differences of
opinion regarding changes in the U.S. Supreme Court's views of
federalism and the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence during
the New Deal era. 148
b. Trends
The twentieth century saw changes in the practice and output of the
High Court of Australia that had a noticeable impact on the HCA's
practice of citing foreign law. Except for citations to U.K. law, which
remained relatively stable over the century,149 High Court citation to
U.S., New Zealand, and Canadian precedents all increased substantially
beginning in the 1970s and continuing until 1999.150 U.S. citations
appeared in 14% of High Court cases between 1903 and 1910, dipping to
9% between 1951 and 1960, rising to 13% between 1971 and 1980, then
spiking to 25% between 1981 and 1990, and 41% between 1991 and
1999.151 By comparison, citations to Canadian and New Zealand
authorities followed a slightly different, though consistently upward
trend, beginning low (4% and 5% respectively) from 1903 to 1910, and
gradually increasing between 1911 and 1980, before spiking in the years
1981 to 1990 (21% and 20% respectively) and 1991 to 1999 (37% and
33% respectively). 152
Turning to U.S. precedents in particular, von Nessen's second study
shows that HCA citation to U.S. precedent varied quite a bit in terms of
the volume and area of law between 1901 and 2002.153 Even so, a
significant majority of the cases citing U.S. authority were categorized
as constitutional law cases. Because the U.S. Constitution provided a
model for parts of the Australian Constitution, it is unsurprising that
the HCA would seek to learn from U.S. constitutional jurisprudence to
better understand certain Australian constitutional provisions. 154
146. Id. at 908.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 908-09.
149. See Topperwien, supra note 126, at 281 tbl.1.
150. See id. Table 1 only provides data up to 1999.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See von Nessen, Australian Experience, supra note 128, at 899.
154. Id. at 904.
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Von Nessen's first study found a significant increase in the number
of citations to U.S. authority beginning in 1971.155 This upward trend
reached a high water mark between 1981 and 1990.156 One explanation
is that between 1975 and 1985, appeals to the Privy Council in London
ceased entirely, leaving the HCA as the final level of appeal for all cases
in Australia.157 This shift enabled greater judicial independence and
might explain the increase in the citation to U.S. precedent overall. 158 In
addition, it is important to note that the increased caseload of the HCA
"would, consequently, be a contributing factor in relation to increased
use of United States cases."159
Although the HCA most often cited U.S. authority in constitutional
law cases, "[t]he relative predomination of constitutional issues in the
early decades was replaced in later years with a broadening range of
legal areas."160 This change occurred within a larger trend of citation to
U.S. precedent, which declined twenty years after the enactment of
Australia's Constitution in 1920, and then increased in the late
twentieth century. 161 Reflecting both the larger trend and the decline in
the number of constitutional issues, the percentage of constitutional law
cases in which the HCA cited U.S. authority dropped from 71.5% to
33.7% between the first and last decade of the first von Nessen study.162
Further, from 1991 to 2002, 35.3% of the U.S. precedents cited were
constitutional law cases, while the number of common law and statutory
law cases continued to rise, even as compared to the last period of the
study.163 One explanation for this trend is that the HCA used U.S.
precedents as a starting point but gradually shifted to using domestic
precedents once these became established. 164 This explanation, however,
does not fully account for what von Nessen describes as "a sudden
reduction in the use of United States cases" between the 1920s and
1990s.165
155. See von Nessen, American Precedents, supra note 55, at 194.
156. See von Nessen, Australian Experience, supra note 128, at 891 tbl.1.
157. Id. at 913-14.
158. Id. As von Nessen discusses, the termination of appeals to the U.K Privy Council
occurred in two phases: first, appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council itself
ended in 1975, but appeals from state supreme courts continued; second, by 1986, appeals
from state courts to the Privy Council ended. See id. at 913.
159. Id. at 898-99.
160. Id. at 899.
161. See id. at 901 graph 2.
162. Id. at 902.
163. Id. at 919-20; see also id. at 919 (tbl. of topics).
164. Id. at 907.
165. Id. at 908.
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Far from an aberration, the significant uptick in HCA citation to
U.S. precedent, noted at the end of von Nessen 1, continued through the
period reviewed in von Nessen 2.166 Between 1991 and 2000, the HCA
cited U.S. authority roughly 211 times per year, and roughly 310 times
per year between 2001 and 2002.167 By contrast, the HCA cited U.S.
precedents an average of 109 times annually between 1981 and 1990,
and roughly fifty-six times annually from 1901 to 1910, the two highest
decades in the initial von Nessen period of study.168
Thus, as of 2002, there appeared to be a steady upward trend in the
number of U.S. court decisions cited by the HCA.169 This trend appears
related to the HCA's increasing consideration of U.S. authority in a
growing range of legal areas. For example, the HCA's citation to U.S.
precedent increased in cases touching on human rights and
international obligations, as well as common law doctrines of contracts
and torts.170 Two reasons suggested for this development are the end of
Privy Council appeals from Australia, and the increased willingness of
the HCA to cite foreign precedent.171 In addition, the HCA recently
began deciding cases based on rights it has found implied in the
language of the Australian Constitution.172 Because, as previously
mentioned, the Australian Constitution is based on elements of the U.S.
Constitution, the HCA might find U.S. constitutional cases newly
relevant, and therefore cite to them.173
c. Other Explanations and Conclusions
As shown above, the High Court of Australia's citation to U.S.
authority constitutes only a small percentage of its total number of
citations to authority. Citation to foreign courts (excluding U.K. courts)
has never accounted for even as much as 6% of total citations by the
HCA,174 and that includes citations to all other foreign countries,
including the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and other common
166. See supra, note 128.
167. See von Nessen, Australian Experience, supra note 128 at 917-18.
168. Id. at 918. See also id. 918 graph 6.
169. Id. at 919 tbl. of topics.
170. Id. at 921.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 922.
173. See id.
174. See Smyth, supra note 127, at 98.
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law countries. 75 In absolute numbers, the HCA has cited secondary
sources significantly more than it has cited U.S. authority.176
One explanation for the infrequent citation to U.S. authority is that
citation practices depend on the historical, social, and cultural milieu
described by Justice Greaney. 77 For example, the decrease in references
to U.S. precedents beginning in the 1920s is arguably a result of the
HCA's determination that Australian legal culture is "more
appropriately guided by British than by United States practice."178
Likewise, it is plausible that the HCA rarely cited U.S. authority prior
to the 1970s, in part, because of differing views on the role of the
judiciary.179 Furthermore, the disregard for U.S. constitutional
precedent during the early and mid-twentieth century arguably resulted
from differing views about federalism and the relative power of the
national government, which greatly increased during the New Deal
era.180
Indeed, such considerations also provide a plausible explanation for
the differing rates of citation to U.S. authority in each area of law. For
example, one reason for the lower incidence of common law and
statutory cases citing U.S. authority is that historical and structural
considerations rendered U.S. case law unhelpful to the HCA.' 8
Regarding the common law, for much of the period studied, the HCA
could not diverge significantly from U.K. law because of the possibility
of appeal to the Privy Council.182 Regarding statutory cases, the HCA
generally went in a different direction than U.S. courts for a variety of
reasons. Prior to the mid-1970s, Australia borrowed little from U.S.
legislative models, rendering U.S. authority on statutory issues of little
help to the HCA.183 Additionally, prior to 1981, Australian courts were
inclined to strictly construe legislative acts, and the HCA did not
consider the same range of constitutional issues, like those in the U.S.
Bill of Rights, in adjudicating statutory cases.184
175. Topperwien, supra note 126, at 281.
176. This inference can be drawn by considering the data noted by both Smyth and
Topperwien. See Smyth, supra note 127, at 98; Topperwien, supra note 126, at 281.
177. See supra Part I.A.1.
178. von Nessen, Australian Experience, supra note 128, at 913. See also Smyth, supra
note 130, at 98 (noting that English courts in aggregate were cited more, in absolute
numbers, than even Australian courts).
179. von Nessen, Australian Experience, supra note 128, at 913.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 906-07.
182. Id. at 906.
183. Id. at 907.
184. Id.
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Von Nessen suggests that the increased citation to U.S. precedent
beginning in the late twentieth century is a result of the HCA's
comparative impulse, rather than the novelty of certain legal questions.
This argument is based on the recognition that "as globally common
issues arise, consideration of the broadest range of potential solutions
and approaches to these common problems is not only permissible, but
advisable."s85 In his view, the data "is consistent with the conclusion
that the High Court now accepts the value of a global perspective, and
that this sustains the increased use of United States authority." 86
Whatever the reason underlying the clear upward trend in HCA citation
to U.S. authority, the data cuts against claims of a diminishing
influence of U.S. authority among foreign jurists.
3. Loose ends
High courts of other nations frequently cite U.S. judicial decisions,
at least in relative terms. However, the overall practice of citing foreign
authority is fairly limited. This is true even in countries that, for
reasons of history, proximity, and constitutional similarities, might
seem logically predisposed to cite U.S. precedents. As the studies of
Canadian citation to U.S. precedent show, "the diffusion of citations [to
U.S. courts does not] fit particularly well with the overtones of the
'emerging judicial community' literature."187 And, as noted in the
discussion of Australian citation, even secondary sources are more
frequently cited than cases from non-U.K. foreign courts, let alone just
U.S. courts.188
That being said, within the relatively small sliver of citations to
foreign precedent in both Canada and Australia, U.S. authority is
second only to U.K. authority in citation frequency.189 Thus, there is
clearly merit to observations that the United States is an "exporter" of
jurisprudence and jurisprudential ideas,190 as well as to claims that the
U.S. Supreme Court wields some measure of influence on national
courts in other countries.' 9 ' Based on the SCC and HCA citation
analysis discussed in this note, claims that U.S. jurisprudential
185. Id. at 922.
186. Id.
187. McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 105.
188. See Smyth, supra note 127, at 98.
189. See supra Parts I.B.1.a, I.B.2.a.
190. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALIsM AND RIGHTS: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD, supra note 62, at 1-15.
191. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 1.
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influence is waning seems speculative or anecdotal, rather than data
driven.
As noted above, the relative influence (measured by citation
analysis) of U.S. authority, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular,
on the Supreme Court of Canada has recently declined. At the same
time,' the data available regarding the citation practices of the High
Court of Australia indicate that citation to U.S. authority in general is
increasing. A review of how U.S. authority is used, as opposed to how
often, will help determine the full extent of the influence the U.S.
Supreme Court wields abroad, as well as any changes to it over time.
Unfortunately, available studies of "how" are less thorough than the
studies of "how often."192
C. Informal Judicial Meetings and Exchanges
Though important, empirical study alone is insufficient to fully
capture the U.S. Supreme Court's influence abroad. Advances in
telecommunications have placed many court decisions at the fingertips
of judges the world over, enabling a curious jurist to access decisions
almost as soon as they are released.193
Beyond technology, it is also important to consider the "informal"
contacts-i.e. interactions beyond the context of adjudicating cases-
between U.S. Supreme Court Justices and their colleagues and
counterparts around the world. In addition to occasionally citing the
opinions of their colleagues, "[j]udges are also meeting face to face"194
and "are getting to know each other better as they interact at
conferences and in personal meetings. . . ."195 These informal contacts
between judges provide opportunities for judges to engage in dialogue
aside from citation of foreign law, undermining claims that the U.S.
Supreme Court is "out of step" with the transnational judicial
dialogue. 96 Anne-Marie Slaughter has expertly catalogued many
192. See, e.g., Bushnell, supra note 81, at 161-63 tbl.3 (breaking down SCC citations into
five classifications: Used, Same, Qualified, Special, Differ. By far the most predominant
category is that of "Used" - "[t]he characteristic of this category is that there is nothing in
the judgment to indicate that anything out of the ordinary is happening. Cases from the
United States appear to be used as the judge would use any case he considered an
authority."); see also McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 114-25 (including a review of how
U.S. authority is used in specific cases; however, this review lacks the same level of
thoroughness as McCormick's empirical studies of citations).
193. See footnote text supra note 114 (discussing electronic databases, and providing
some examples of internet-based legal resources and courts posting their decisions online).
194. Slaughter, supra note 5, at 1120.
195. McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 105.
196. See supra note 8, and accompanying text.
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examples of such contacts,197 and the following merely supplements her
valuable work.
Slaughter observes that judges around the world are meeting at
inter-judicial conferences, 98 via judicial exchanges, 99 and through
conferences sponsored by law schools and NGOs.200 One prominent
example is the gathering of the Organization of Supreme Courts of the
Americas (OSCA), hosted in Washington, D.C. in 1995. Chaired by then-
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the meeting boasted attendees from
twenty-five countries representing North America, Central America,
South America, and the Caribbean. 201 Some of these experiences have
been noted in judicial opinions. 202 In addition, "[a] flood of foundation
and government funding for judicial seminars, training programs, and
197. See Slaughter, supra note 5, at 1120-23.
198. Id. at 1121. Some conferences have even spawned publications intended to
facilitate transnational judicial dialogue on specific issues. For example, the Hague
Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) publishes a semi-regular newsletter
titled The Judge's Newsletter on International Child Protection. HCCH PUBLICATIONS,
http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act=publications.1isting&sub=5 (last visited Jan. 9,
2011) (providing a free archive of published newsletters).
199. Id. at 1118-20. See also William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 20th Anniversary Judicial Conference (Apr. 8,
2002), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp-
04-08-02a.html (discussing the efforts of the International Judicial Relations Committee of
the Judicial Conference, and commenting on numerous international exchanges he had
participated in with countries such as Russia, Canada, Mexico, India, Germany, and
others).
200. Slaughter, supra note 5, at 1121-22. See also Michel Rosenfeld, Justices at Work:
An Introduction 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1609 (1997) (reviewing a day-long conference, held at
the Cardozo Law School on September 19, 1995, that brought together judges and
constitutional scholars from seven countries to adjudicate a Moot Court competition.
Among the participants, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme Court); Ami
Eden, Bork Turns Kagan Process into Fight over Israeli Justice, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC
AGENCY, June 29, 2010, http://jta.org/newslarticle/2010/06/29/2739826/bork-turns-kagan-
process-into-fight-over-israeli-justice (noting Justice Scalia's introduction of Israel
Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak at the March 2007 meeting of the American
Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists). For a seemingly exhaustive list of various
international judicial organizations and conferences, as well as an extensive list of
international judicial seminars and similar efforts, see HAGUE INST. FOR THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW [HIILl, INVENTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY CONFERENCE
CONCEPT PAPER AND OUTLINE OF WORKSHOPS app. A (2008),
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1511143 (prepared for the HiiL Law of the Future Conference:
The Changing Role of Highest Courts in an Internationalising World, Oct. 23-24, 2008).
201. See Justices, Judges from Across Western Hemisphere Assemble, Create Charter for
New Organization of Supreme Courts, INTL JUD. OBSERVER, Jan. 1996, at 1, 1, available
at http://www.fic.gov/publicipdf.nsfllookup/intobsO2.pdfl$Filelintobs2.pdf. See generally
40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 969 (1996) (the entire issue is dedicated to publication of the OSCA
1995 conference proceedings).
202. E.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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educational materials under the banner [of] 'rule of law' programs has
significantly expanded the opportunities for cross-fertilization."203
Furthermore, U.S. Supreme Court Justices have given at least seven
speeches in four countries over the last ten years.204 Some Justices have
engaged in literary projects with counterparts from abroad, 205 and the
Court has paid tribute to fallen colleagues abroad. 206
II. (BIG) "GRAINS OF SALT"
While not exhaustive, the data available from citation analysis
challenges the view that the U.S. Supreme Court wields diminished
influence abroad. That view appears to be largely based on anecdotal
evidence, and the preceding sections are intended to provide some
much-needed context in which to accurately assess these assertions. By
focusing on measurable indicators and accounting for more intangible
avenues of influence and exchange, the foregoing has shed some light on
what influence the U.S. Supreme Court actually wields in the emerging
global judicial community. This Note has reviewed the frequency of
citation to U.S. precedent in Canada and Australia and placed that data
in perspective vis-A-vis frequency of citation to both foreign and
municipal precedent. In addition, the discussion presented an overview
of the various activities the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court engage
in that place them in contact with counterparts and colleagues across
the globe.
Regarding the contention of waning Supreme Court influence
abroad, an analysis of actual citation practice undermines the validity of
its contenders' anecdotal evidence. As noted, in absolute numbers the
citation to foreign precedent by the SCC and HCA represents only a
fraction of the total number of citations to judicial authority employed
by these two courts. Thus, any measurable influence occurs within a
relatively minor segment of the jurisprudence of these courts, and even
then the data does not necessitate the conclusion that U.S. influence is
waning. Indeed, in the case of Australia, the number of citations to U.S.
authority trends up.
203. Slaughter, supra note 5, at 1117.
204. Speeches, Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/speeches.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2010).
205. E.g., William Creeley, Book Note, A Useful Conversation, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 694
(2005) (reviewing JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVERSATION (Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds., 2004)).
206. See, e.g., Justices, Law Enforcement Officials Pay Tribute to Assassinated Italian
Judge, The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times, Oct. 29, 2009, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/
blt/2009/10/justices-law-enforcement-officials-pay-tribute-to-assassinated-italian-
judge.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
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Citation to U.S. authority by the SCC remained fairly consistent
from 1945 to 2008, and citation to U.S. authority trended up between
1945 and 1994. The fact that SCC citation to U.S. Supreme Court
authority most frequently referred to decisions of the Warren and
Burger Courts undermines claims that citation to the U.S. Supreme
Court has diminished because of political differences over the last
decade. Nor does the SCC's slight decrease in U.S. Supreme Court
citations and slight increase in U.S. state court citations necessarily
speak to a diminishing influence of the U.S. Supreme Court. This is
especially true in light of changes in the type of cases appearing on the
SCC's docket.
One could reasonably conclude that changes in citation to the U.S.
Supreme Court are a result of municipal law maturing to the point at
which continued reference to foreign authority, whether from the
United States or elsewhere, is less helpful than reliance on domestic
precedent.207 Such an inference does not necessarily speak to a
diminishing influence, at least no more so than it speaks to a
diminishing need for direct reliance on foreign authority to decide cases
involving established legal principles. Perhaps if citation to foreign
authority were shown to increase, but citation to the U.S. Supreme
Court dropped off in favor of other non-municipal authority, the claims
of diminishing influence would appear more credible. That is not the
case at present, at least with regard to the U.S. Supreme Court's
influence on Canadian jurisprudence. Rather, concluding that municipal
jurists have simply opted for established domestic authority over foreign
decisions may even speak to a lasting influence, if the domestic
principles were initially derived from foreign sources.
The data pertaining to Australia cut more strikingly against the
claims of diminishing influence. Citation to U.S. authority, and the U.S.
Supreme Court in particular, represents a small segment of the HCA's
overall citation. Indeed, citation to non-municipal authority other than
U.K. decisions has been consistently outpaced by citation to secondary
sources. For example, in 1996 citation to secondary sources accounted
for 10.5% of all citations by the HCA, as compared to citation to non-
U.K. foreign authority accounting for only 5.4%.
Yet within this small segment of HCA citation, the data reflects a
possible increase in U.S. influence. Unlike the citation practice of the
SCC, the HCA demonstrated an upward trend in the citation to U.S.
authority. With the exception of the decade 1951 to 1960, the percent of
cases citing U.S. authority trends up, peaking at 41% in the decade 1991
207. See, e.g., McCormick 2, supra note 24, at 129 ("The real story of the evolution of
Canadian jurisprudence is its steadily increasing focus on domestic judicial authority,
especially that of the Supreme Court itself, and not on foreign sources.").
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to 1999. And citation to U.S. authority increased to 310 citations per
year for 2001 to 2002 from the average of 211 citations per year for 1991
to .2000. By comparison, the percent of cases citing authority from
Canada and New Zealand also trend upward over the twentieth
century. Far from supporting assertions of diminishing influence, the
data points in the opposite direction: that of increasing relevance, if not
influence, of the U.S. Supreme Court at a time when the HCA was
increasingly open to the use of foreign authority. The fact that HCA
citation to U.S. authority spread to additional legal areas at the same
time the frequency of citation increased further supports an inference of
increased relevance and influence.
There are other reasons, in addition to the conclusions drawn from
the data above, that counsel skepticism of claims that the U.S. Supreme
Court is losing its influence. While this paper has focused on citation
analysis as a verifiable metric to use in assessing the relative influence
of the U.S. Supreme Court, citation analysis alone may not account for
the full picture. Influence may come from conversations at conferences,
speaking engagements, and through non-judicial projects. 208 Influence
might also come from simply staying current with jurisprudential
developments abroad. Indeed, despite disagreeing about citing foreign
law in opinions, Justices Breyer and Scalia agree on the potential utility
of keeping informed of the decisions of other national and constitutional
courts.209
Also, given the small number of citations under discussion, and the
views professed by Justices and academics advocating comparativism,
the precise nature of the Court's influence is ambiguous. To be sure, any
precedent considered will have some measure of influence, even if only
serving as background. But given the overall context of the comparative
exercise and the manner in which foreign precedent is apparently used,
precisely what influence the U.S. Supreme Court is supposed to be
losing is unclear. To hear the Justices of the SCC and HCA discuss their
use of foreign authority, 210 or to consider Justice Breyer's views of
appropriate use of comparative materials, 211 one wonders what it was
208. As noted above, Slaughter, one of the more prolific writers on the subject of the
emerging global judicial community, has accounted for this variable in some detail. See
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, supra note 5, at 1120-23.
209. Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35, at 534 (responding to Justice
Breyer's comment that it was not unreasonable to seek to learn how other, similarly
situated courts had addressed particular issues, Justice Scalia said, "I'm not preventing
you from reading these cases . . . I mean, go ahead and indulge your curiosity! Just don't
put it in your opinions!").
210. See generally L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 13 (SCC Justice); La Forest, supra note
64 (SCC Justice).
211. See Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35, at 541.
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the United States was exporting.212 Rather than actual jurisprudence, 213
perhaps it was a model of constitutionalism. 214 If So, then it is difficult to
see how U.S. influence diminishes by the exercise of a uniquely
American contribution-judicial revieW215-merely because others do
not routinely consult the results.
If the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court is waning, there are
explanations for the phenomenon that are not tied to the Court's
apparent hostility to citing foreign authority. As noted by Justice
Greaney, law almost always emerges from a specific context, and this
background shapes the ways in which courts apply the law to the cases
before them. 216 Such a view could explain some of the ebb and flow of
U.S. Supreme Court citations in foreign courts over time. For example,
when facing novel constitutional cases, a court might be more inclined
to look abroad to more experienced tribunals for guidance. One would
anticipate an increase in the citation to the U.S. Supreme Court when
addressing novel constitutional instruments or issues, and that such
citations would recede in favor of reliance on domestic precedent once it
is established. Smithey arrived at this conclusion in her analysis of the
citation practices of Canadian and South African high courts. 217 And, as
discussed above, Bushnell suggests a similar explanation for the
relatively high frequency of U.S. citations early in the SCC's history.218
The general trends in citation to U.S. precedent abroad could also be
considered a reflection of historical developments. For instance,
Bushnell argues compellingly that the early willingness to rely on U.S.
precedent by the SCC may have resulted from the prevailing view of the
common law at the time.219 Von Nessen highlights as a turning point
212. But compare Slaughter's contention that constitutional law used to be an export in
Liptak, supra note 1 (quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter).
213. "Jurisprudence" here means decisions, opinions, and judicial analysis. As noted
above, even advocates of comparative practice do not argue for wholesale adoption of
foreign decisions.
214. See Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37,
48 (1993) ("American constitutional experience . . . has appeared to be singularly
innovative and successful and thus serves as a world model.").
215. See generally William R Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial
Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329 (1995) (describing early conceptions of judicial review
during the Founding era).
216. Greaney, supra note 50, at 145. Justice Scalia made a similar observation, noting that
"[o]ne of the difficulties of using foreign law is that you don't understand what the
surrounding jurisprudence is." Conversation Between Scalia & Breyer, supra note 35, at 528.
217. Smithey, supra note 61, at 1199 ("[T]here is . . . a decline in reliance on foreign
sources as time passes and the availability of indigenous constitutional precedent
increases.").
218. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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the determination by the HCA that Australian jurisprudence was more
similar to, and therefore better guided by, U.K. courts than by U.S.
courts. 220 And McCormick contends that the sharp increase in citation to
U.S. precedent in the 1990s validates authors who projected that the
enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would be
accompanied by an increased reliance on U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 221
Similarly, skepticism should extend to assertions that the United
States risks lagging behind global jurisprudence by failing to partake in
the transnational judicial dialogue happening via citation. While the
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court may presently debate the merits of
comparative jurisprudence, the history depicted by Calabresi and
Zimdahl clearly demonstrates that citation to foreign authority is not
alien to the U.S. Supreme Court. And there is clearly another level of
interaction between the Justices and their counterparts abroad beyond
citation. Examples include the apparent interest in remaining informed
of the jurisprudential developments in other countries, participation in
formal judicial conferences, international judicial organizations,
speaking engagements, and literary ventures. The number and variety
of these activities makes clear that the Justices of the Supreme Court
are taking an active role in at least some elements of the emerging
judicial community. Thus, the risk of lagging behind may be
exaggerated.
In sum, when one looks past the anecdotal evidence and considers
the verifiable metric of citation analysis, one finds good reason to
approach the claims of Choudhry, Ginsburg, Justice Kirby, Justice L-
Heureux-Dub6, Lefler, Slaughter, and others with skepticism. Although
not conducted here, a review of other national and constitutional courts'
citation practices could prove illuminating as to what influence is
wielded by the U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, citation analysis of
the courts of countries such as Germany and Israel, with legal systems
embracing judicial review while not being rooted entirely in common
law, might prove particularly useful. Furthermore, there are other
plausible explanations for trends in citation to the U.S. Supreme Court,
and U.S. courts overall, that do not herald a decline in influence.
Although not sufficient to dismiss claims of declining influence outright,
the citation analysis and alternative explanations addressed in this note
provide ample reason to seek additional data before drawing conclusions
about the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court abroad.
220. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Christopher P. Manfredi, The Use of United States Decisions by the
Supreme Court of Canada Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 23 CAN. J. POL. SC.
499, 499-500 (1990).
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